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Strict vs. Substantial Compliance...
The Rocky Road of Maryland Wiretap Law
A Comment on Recent Maryland Wiretap Decisions
by Michael McDonough
In the landmark case of State v. Siegel,
266 Md. 256, 292, A.2d 86 (1972),
(hereinafter cited as Siegel), the Mary-
land Court of Appeals held that "[T]he
[Maryland Wiretap] statute sets up a
strict procedure that must be followed
and we will not abide any deviation,
no matter how slight, from the pre-
scribed path." Id. at 274, 292 A.2d at
95. Applying this standard, the Court
suppressed evidence from a wiretap in
which the order of authorization did
not include provisions as to "whether
or not the interception shall automati-
cally terminate when the described
communication has been first ob-
tained," 18 U.S.C. 2518(4) (e) (1976).
The court stated that interception
would "be conducted in such a way as
to minimize the interception of com-
munications not otherwise subject to
interception" Id. 2518(5). 18 U.S.C.
2510 et seq. (1976) required that
every order of authorization contain
such provisions. The scrutiny applied
by the court in Siegel has become
known as the strict compliance stand-
ard.
Just two years later, Judge Charles
Moylan, writing for the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals in Spease and Ross v. State, 21
Md. App. 269, 319 A.2d 560 (1974),
aff'd 275 Md. 88, 383 A.2d 284 (1975)
(hereinafter cited as Spease and Ross),
applied a more lenient substantial com-
pliance standard. Spease and Ross questi-
oned whether the police, who had
intercepted conversations pursuant to
a legally sufficient order, had also ade-
quately minimized the interception of
non-pertinent conversations in accor-
dance with 18 U.S.C. 2518(5) (1976).
Judge Moylan noted:
It was in this regard that the
Court of Appeals said in the Siegel
case: 'The statute sets up a strict
procedure that must be followed
and we will not abide any devia-
tion, no matter how slight from
the prescribed path,' and we said
in the Lee case: '... the procedure
required by the federal act must
be strictly followed and... a sub-
stantial compliance [is] insuffi-
cient.' We are not here faced,
however, with the legitimacy of
the authorizing order itself and do
not, therefore, feel that language
pertinent thereto is necessarily
controlling when reviewing every
subsidiary action taken in execu-
tion of an order which does meet
all constitutional requirements.
Spease and Ross 21 Md. App. at 275,
319 A.2d at 564.
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That standard was also applied to ser-
vice of inventory in the same case.
The Court of Appeals, reviewing Spease
and Ross, affirmed, also applying the
substantial compliance standard. Id. at 99,
338 A.2d at 290-291.
The ultimate result of these two
cases appeared to be clear. The Court
would apply the strict compliance standard
in analyzing the legality of the author-
ization for and issuance of the wiretap
order, while applying the more lenient
substantial compliance standard to analysis
of the execution and post-execution
procedures.
In 1977, the Maryland Legislature
enacted the Wiretapping and Elec-
tronic Surveillance Act, Md. Code
Ann C.J. §§10-401 et. seq' (1980 Rep.
vol.) (hereinafter cited as The Wiretap-
ping Act).
Any aggrieved person may move to
suppress wiretap evidence on the
grounds that:
(i) The communication was
unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) The order of authorization
under which it was inter-
cepted is insufficient on its
face, or was not obtained or
issued in strict compliance
with this subtitle; or
(iii) The interception was not
made in conformity with the
order of authorization. Id. at
§10-408(h)(i)(i).
The statute simply codifies the law as
developed by the Court in Siegel, and
Spease and Ross. Under The Wiretapping
Act, strict compliance is the standard
in determining the legal sufficiency of
the application, supporting affidavits,
and order. Id. at 10-408 (h)(i)(ii). If
these documents do not meet the
stringent test of Siegel, suppression is
the remedy. The enunciation of this
strict compliance language is conspic-
uous in its absence from The Wiretap-
ping Act, Id. at 10-408 (h)(i) concerning
illegal interceptions and concerning
the manner in which the authoriza-
tion is executed Id. at 10-408 (h)(i)(iii).
The only rational conclusion is that
the Legislature intended to codify the
pronouncements of the Court in Siegel
and Spease and Ross.
In Poore v. State, 39 Md. App. 44, 384
A.2d 103 (1978) (hereinafter cited as
Poore) Chief Judge Richard Gilbert,
speaking for the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals took the first in a ser-
ies of steps which resulted in the
uneven path that the wiretap case law
has traversed. Although the issues,
minimization and service of inven-
tory, were the same as those raised in
Spease and Ross, Judge Gilbert postu-
lated a new rationale for the same
result:
At first glance Spease appears to
conflict with Siegel. A careful read-
ing of both cases makes it trans-
picuous that Siegel is directed to
pre-intercept and intercept condi-
tions. As to these two (2) happen-
ings, not the slightest deviation
from the statute will be sancti-
oned. On the other hand, Spease
indicates that when post-
intercept events are brought into
question, the Court looks to the
facts so as to ascertain whether
there has been substantial com-
pliance with the post-intercept
provisions of the act and whether
there has been actual prejudice to
the defendant. Id. at 53, 384 A.2d
at 110.
That this statement is a radical depar-
ture from the holding in Spease and Ross
is underscored by Judge Gilbert's own
words. He categorically states "Spease
and Ross v. State... distinguishes between
pre-order compliance and post-order
compliance." Id. at 52,384 A.2d at 109
(emphasis added). This statement
accurately categorizes Spease and Ross.
The pre-intercept, intercept, post-
intercept analysis of Spease and Ross,
and Siegel, explicated by Judge Gilbert
in Poore, has generated more confu-
sion and insecurity than any other
single Maryland decision in the area
of electronic surveillance.
At first glance, the addition of the
requirement of strict compliance dur-
ing the intercept stage of a wiretap
does not appear to be a radical change
in the prior law. Closer examination,
however, reveals that such a require-
ment significantly reduces the possi-
bilities for application of the substantial
compliance standard and is inconsistent
with the application of that lesser
standard to minimization.
The three-phase analysis ostensi-
bly applied in Poore, cannot survive
careful scrutiny even in its own con-
text. The two major issues in Poore
were minimization and service of in-
ventory. Service of inventory is to be
made "within a reasonable time but
not later than 90 days after the ter-
mination of an order or extensions
thereof." The Wiretapping Act, at 10-
405(g)(4). Thus, service of inventory
is clearly a post-intercept matter gov-
erned, under the three-phase frame-
work, by the standard of substantial
compliance. But what of minimiza-
tion? Both federal and Maryland law
require that interceptions be conducted
"...in such a way as to minimize..."
18 U.S.C. 2518(5) (1976), The Wire-
tapping Act, 10-408 (e). It seems clear,
then, that minimization occurs dur-
ing the intercept stage. Under Judge
Gilbert's three-phase framework, strict
compliance is clearly required. Yet in
both Spease and Ross, and Poore, a substan-
tial compliance standard was utilized. Sig-
nificantly, Judge Gilbert does not even
attempt to fit minimization into his
framework. He simply follows Spease
and Ross and the federal cases on
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which that decision was founded.
In Baldwin v. State, 45 Md. App. 378,
413 A.2d 246 (1980) (hereinafter cited
as Baldwin) Judge Gilbert again deviates
from the path laid out by the Court of
Appeals and the Maryland Wiretap Act,
marking his route with the signpost-
P.I.P .... He explains his framework
thus:
The first part, known as the
pre-intercept stage, requires, under
Siegel and its progeny, strict com-
pliance with the Md. Cts. and
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. (1980 Rep.
Vol.) 10-401 through 10-412.
The second part may be charac-
terized as the interception or on-going
phase, at which time the law
enforcement agency actually con-
ducts the electronic interception
of the communication. The
second phase also necessitates
that there not be the slightest
deviation from the letter of the
act. The third part is stylistically
known as the post-interception phase.
It dictates what is to be done after
the interception has been com-
pleted. Violation of the latter
does not mandate suppression of
the evidence derived from the
interception, unless the party
whose communication was inter-
cepted can show that he has been
prejudiced by the non-compliance
with the statute. Spease v. State,
supra. Thus, aware of P.I.P.-i.e.,
pre-interception and post
interception,-we turn our atten-
tion to the instant case. Baldwin at
381-382, 413 A.2d at 249.
Just how this framework was app-
lied in Baldwin is a matter for specula-
tion. After deciding that the order of
authorization must contain a desig-
nation of intervals at which reports
must be made to the issuing judge
(clearly a pre-intercept matter), Judge
Gilbert finds an intercept stage viola-
tion to which he applies a strict com-
pliance standard. It is unclear from
the opinion what intercept stage viola-
tion occurred.
In January of 1981, the Court of
Appeals issued its opinion in State- v.
Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 433 A.2d 1021
(1981) (hereinafter cited as Bailey).
There the Court harmonized Siegel,
with Spease and Ross, in a significantly
different manner than did the Court
of Special Appeals in Poore, saying:
The difference between the
two cases is clear. The statutory
provisions which require the
wiretap order to conform to spe-
cific minimum guidelines are
those which the legislature per-
ceives to contain minimum safe-
guards to constitutional rights.
Once the directives of the statute
have been met and a valid order
has been issued, compliance, at
least in the area of minimization
of unauthorized communications
and service of inventory, can be
judged by a more lenient substan-
tial compliance standard. Bailey,
supra, at 153-54, 422 A.2d at 1027.
The Court comes very close to declar-
ing the federal standard of analysis
expressed in U.S. v. Donovan, 429 U.S.
413 (1977); U.S. v. Giordano, 416 U.S.
505 (1974); and U.S. v. Chavez, 416 U.S.
562 (1974). It cannot fully adopt that
standard, however, because Maryland,
in requiring strict compliance in obtain-
ing and issuing an order, has adopted
a more stringent standard by statute.
The Wiretapping Act at 10-408 (i) (ii).
The Court of Appeals is typically
cautious, restricting the scope of its
analysis to "minimization of unauth-
orized communication and service of
inventory..." Bailey, supra at 154, 422
A.2d at 1027. The implications, how-
ever, are clear. According to the Court
of Appeals, there are two phases to
consider in a wiretap case-preauthori-
zation, where strict compliance is
mandated; and post-authorization,
where substantial compliance may be
sufficient.
In affirming the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals, the Court
of Appeals in State v. Baldwin, 289 Md.
635, 426 A.2d 916 (1981), (hereinaf-
ter cited as State v. Baldwin), clearly
rejected the P.I.P. analytical frame-
work. After referring to the harmon-
izing of Spease and Ross and Siegel, the
Court of Appeals in Baldwin v. State
stated:
The establishment of these
intervals by the issuing judge is
essential to safeguard against
unwarranted intrusions on per-
sonal privacy rights, and, unlike
the situation in Spease and Ross, is
central to the statutory scheme-
a precondition to the issuance of
a valid order, as in Siegel and Bai-
ley. It is clear to us that the Mary-
land Legislature, in enacting the
provision of 10-408 (i) that sup-
pression was an appropriate
remedy where the order of inter-
ception was not issued "in strict
compliance" with the Act,
intended to adopt the Siegel stand-
ard to govern violations of pre-
conditions to the issuance of a
valid order. Id. at 643-44, 639-49,
426 A.2d at 921-22.
The Court of Appeals is slowly but
surely smoothing over the ruts left in
the road by the Court of Special
Appeals. The analysis applied in Bald-
win v. State is somewhat strained. Unlike
provisions required by statute to be
included in the order of authorization
such as that omitted in Bailey, which
were clearly preauthorization, the
failure of an issuing judge to desig-
nate reporting intervals after the order
is signed is not so easily categorized.
The Court seems to conclude that,
because the establishment of report-
ing intervals ". . .is essential to safe-
guard against unwarranted intrusions
on personal privacy rights..." and"...
is central to statutory scheme. .. ", it
is therefore a pre-authorization
requirement. Baldwin v. State at 643,
426 A.2d at 922. These two factors do
not, however, necessarily lead to the
conclusion reached. The more logical
test to determine whether a matter is
pre-authorization or post-authori-
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zation is whether it may occur before
or after issuance of the order. Under
the Court of Appeals State v. Baldwin
standard, the judge may designate
reporting intervals after the order
itself is issued. Thus, at least in a
mechanical sense, the designation of
reporting intervals is a post-author-
ization matter.
At this point it is important to recall
that the Court has not drawn a bright
line categorically requiring a substan-
tial compliance test for post-author-
ization matters. The language used,
both in Spease and Ross, and Bailey, was
permissive-substantial compliance
may be permitted with regard to post-
authorization requirements.
It was, therefore, not necessary for
the Court to force the designation of
reporting intervals into the pre-author-
ization mold. It could have determined
that, with regard to post-authorization
matters, a substantial compliance test would
be applied unless the requirement
was "...essential to safeguard against
unwarranted intrusions on personal
privacy rights and... [was] central to
the statutory scheme." State v. Baldwin
at 643, 426 A.2d at 922. This reason-
ing satisfies the stringent strict com-
pliance mandate of the Maryland Wiretap
Act, and provides a reasonable stand-
ard for determining whether strict or
substantial compliance should be re-
quired for particular post-authori-
zation matters. It eliminates the danger
of breaking the mold which was only
bent by the Chief Appeals in State v.
Baldwin. This approach would be both
consistent with the statutory scheme
and would provide a substantive rather
than a mechanical test in this area,
which so greatly affects fundamental
principles of privacy.
Hopefully, this is an accurate map
of the path the Court of Appeals has
followed, and a correct prognostica-
tion as to its ultimate destination.
However, until the Court explicitly
rejects the three-phase framework
set forth by the Court of Special
Appeals in Baldwin, and develops a
comprehensive substantive test to
determine when substantial compli-
ance will be permitted, the electronic
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